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    A COMMON LAW AGENDA FOR LABOUR LAW
The development of labour law has been such that, whilst some commentators
have been able to express satisfaction at the richness of contemporary discourse
by which the subject has been developed,1 it has nevertheless been possible to
pose fundamental questions about its very purpose.2  The  subject stands astride
an apparent bifurcation  identified by Hepple3  who  poses the conundrum that
if labour law in a given nation state effectively continues to serve its traditional
protective function  multinational corporations may withdraw to more
profitable low cost, low regulated economies so forcing each state to compete
by "de-regulating" its employment protection.  This  encourages what Brandeis
called  the “race to the bottom”.4
Globalisation is not the only concern.  In the UK,  governments have accepted
the argument that the greater the success labour law enjoys in its traditional role
the greater the number of jobs destroyed. 5  Employment  policies have been
designed to enhance employment opportunity for all types of enterprise (not
just international business) by  reducing labour costs.   The casualisation of the
workforce, fixed term contracts (buttressed by waiver clauses6), the extension
of time-limits for qualifying for unfair dismissal7 and redundancy payments, the
abolition of wages councils, the shift to individual pay bargaining,  privatisation
and the promotion of a non-standard workforce, as well as policies designed to
dismantle the collective bargaining system illustrate the extent to which
government policy has been predicated by an assumed trade-off between high
reward and high security on the one hand and employment opportunity on the
other. Labour law can no longer be explained as a force designed to redress an
inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee.  This has  lead
                                                          
1  Collins, The Productive Disintegration of Labour Law (1997) 26 ILJ 295.
2  E.g., Hepple  in The Future of Labour Law (1995) 24 ILJ 303.
3  New Approaches to International Labour Regulation (1997) 26 ILJ 353
4  Liggett v. Lee [1933] US 557.
5   Hepple questions this argument, supra n.2  at 356.    
6  The Employment Rights Bill 1999, cl 17, if enacted, will  abolish waiver clauses in respect of  unfair
dismissal but not redundancy cases. At present, a recent decision of the Court of Appeal encourages
resort to these clauses by upholding their validity where a fixed term contract is extended for a period
of less than a year: BBC v. Kelly-Phillips [1998] IRLR  294.
7  The Unfair Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 1985  SI 1985/782.
2Fredman to ask whether the subject can be re-invented to accommodate the
needs and rights of workers as well as a flexible low cost  workforce.8
However, just as domestically inspired statutory reforms (as opposed to those
originating in the European Union) have whittled away at employment rights
with  general consistency  there has similarly been an unexpected common law
extension of those rights which has undoubtedly been gathering momentum.  It
is through the medium of the re-contractualisation of employment law that
some radically innovative reforms are being delivered.   These have been of
profound effect.   Notable decisions which  have extended the scope of terms
implied by law into the contract of employment include  Malik v. B.C.C.I. 9 in
which the House of  Lords held that here an employer conducts the business in
a manner likely to destroy trust and confidence, and damage to the employee's
reputation thereby ensues to the prejudice of future employment prospects,
damages will lie.  In  Goold (Pearmark) Ltd v. McConnell 10 the EAT
established a new implied duty binding the employer  to ensure the employee
has a reasonable and prompt opportunity to obtain redress of any grievance.
And a new obligation of disclosure was imposed on employers by the House of
Lords in  Scally v. Southern Health and Services Board.11  It is the purpose of
this article to examine some of these developments to discover what may be the
common law agenda for labour law.    Four influences on the future direction of
this subject may be identified.                                       
Influence 1.
This is the traditional laissez-faire contractual model which understands
employment contracts  merely as private transactions which result from the free
agreement of actors.  There is an assumption that parties enter the transaction
from a position of equal bargaining power. Contracts result from competitive
dealing and are motivated by the self-interest of the parties.  Proponents of this
                                                          
8  Fredman, Labour Law in Flux: the Changing Composition of the Workforce  (1997) 26 ILJ 337, 340.
However, the economic arguments have not gone unchallenged.  Ewing has suggested that the state has
an interest in securing high wages and employment standards because workers participate in the
economy as consumers and so create demand for goods and services, thus creating jobs:  Democratic
Socialism and Law (1995) ILJ 103  Moreover, the failure of government to advance objective evidence
of the practical success of its employment policy can hardly go unnoticed:  R v. Secretary of State for
Employment ex p Seymour-Smith [1995] IRLR 464 (CA); R v. Secretary of State for Employment ex p.
Equal Opportunities Commission [1994] IRLR  176.
9  [1997] IRLR 462.
10  [1995] IRLR 516.
11  [1991] 4 All ER 563.
3model adhere to a conception of justice which emphasises deserts and
disregards need. 12   Judicial intervention is concerned only with rules for
ensuring free competitive dealing, and for preserving and enforcing the reality
of agreement.
Influence 2
This is the view that the state has a role in ensuring conditions of civilised life.
Some argue that this role should be minimal. Thus individual actors should be
free to conclude employment contracts, but  at the margins the interests of the
weaker party demand and receive protection. A considerable disparity in
bargaining power would be seen as inimical to the latter consideration and the
law should address this disparity.   Indeed the State itself has adopted a strategy
aimed at ensuring minimum employment conditions, most notably by
establishing the “floor of rights”.13 Others argue that there are moral claims to
fair labour standards, as there are to the wider protection of human rights. 14
The role of the state should be to enforce those moral rights.    
 According to the voluntarist theory, equilibrium might best be achieved
through collective bargaining which itself required  the state to neutralise
common law rules which would tend to undermine the activities of organised
labour. 15  The failure of voluntarism  lead the state to adopt an alternative
strategy aimed at  ensuring minimum employment conditions, most notably by
pursuing the enactment of certain minimum standards  (i.e. the "floor of
rights").  
 Influence 3
                                                          
12  However,  "need" assumes a particular ideology which holds that worker benefit from and require
increased employment protection .  According to a different ideology the long term  interest of worker
is assured through a free market which is impeded by employment regulation:  see, e.g., Hayek, Law,
Legislation and Liberty, Routledge and Kegan, Paul (1982), The Constitution of Liberty,  Routledge
and Kegan, Paul (1960).
  13However, the state's activities in this area might arguably have extended beyond certain minimum
standards.    See, for example, time off for public duties under  Employment Rights Act 1996, s.50.
Omissions  from the "floor" suggest that not all minimum measures were included.    The absence of
controls on working hours and guaranteed minimum holidays are possible examples.
14  See note 23 below.
15  Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law 3rd edit.,  London, (1983).
4 This is the vew that employment contracts should recognise that enterprise is a
co-operative venture. An employment contract, unlike a paradigm commercial
contract, is not merely an exchange.   Eisenberg, asserts that employment
contracts create a relationship for which many contractual principles
(developed for commercial contracts) are inappropriate.16 He contends that
relational contracts create a relationship of mutual enterprise which might result
in the adjustment of orthodox contractual principles to require, inter alia, an
emphasis upon good faith performance. 17  Each party is permitted to advance
their own interests, but they must also have a genuine concern to promote the
interests of the other party in so far as compatible with their own.   This model
emphasises co-operation, good faith, and disclosure.   The development of
implied terms in high trust roles18 may have been influenced by this model,
which also places an emphasis  upon the manner in which parties deal with one
another.
Influence 4
The employment contract is not viewed as an exclusively private transaction
but as one which ultimately concerns the wealth of society. The courts are
concerned to promote the societal need for the enhancement of aggregate
wealth. Where this societal need conflicts with an individual need then the
former prevails. The conditions for fulfilment of this societal need will not
always coincide with the employer’s interest in ensuring the subordination of
the employee. Societal need is not necessarily promoted by unbridled
managerial power.
In this article the following argument will be proposed. Whilst the rights of the
employer have been extended by the common law the judiciary has not been
invariably influenced by the need to protect the weaker party. Although some
new rights have been created, the judiciary has also refused to confer rights. 19
Where this latter course has occurred, the ultimate purpose has not been to re-
inforce management power for its own sake, as would be the case if influence 1
were paramount. An analysis of the case law shows that whether the right is
                                                          
16  Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, eds. Beatson and Friedman, (1994)
17  McKendrick  in his essay,  The Regulation of Long-Term Contracts in English Law, ibid., maintains
an opposing case, although conceding that there may be a requirement for greater flexibility in long-
term contracts.
18   See e.g.,  B.T. v. Ticehurst  [1992] IRLR 219.
19  See for examples infra- notes 99-107 and accompanying text for some instances where the common
law  has chosen not to confer new rights.
5accorded or refused, the judiciary is influenced not only be the needs of the
individual relationship but also by a view of the common law as a partner in
developing a system of employment regulation which is perceived to promote
enterprise and wealth creation. In essence the common law sees its contribution
to labour law as a device for maximising the efficiency of the enterprise and
promoting the creation of wealth for the benefit of the national economy. 20
 Whilst many recent decisions  are more than genuflexions towards the need to
achieve justice21 between individual employees and their employers,
employment protection is accorded a  priority which only determines outcomes
in cases when it is complementary to wealth maximisation.  However, the
judiciary often recognise and give effect to moral claims provided these are
consistent with wealth maximisation.  The rights of the employee are extended
only when to do so is perceived to deliver a net economic benefit.  A perceived
loss precludes the common law extension of employment protection even if this
fails to do justice in particular circumstances.22
This development poses questions going to the root of the purpose of
conferring individual  employment rights.  There may be considerable dissent
from the view that  influence 4 should govern the future direction of
employment policy. There is the view that a wider extension of employment
rights is axiomatic and should be accorded priority, not only because of the
moral claim to fair labour standards, but also because employment rights are
part of a broader notion of individual citizenship, which has been identified as a
                                                          
20   According to  micoreconomic theory, firms maximise profit.  Efficiency may be defined as  a state
in which it is impossible to produce the same output using a lower cost combination of inputs, or one in
which it is not possible to  produce more output using the same combination of inputs.  Government
policy has been predicated upon the belief that an efficient enterprise promotes wealth.  For example,
greater profit leads to investment in more modern machinery and further advancements in
competitiveness in global markets.  However economists assume rational actors.   Individuals and
individual firms do not always act rationally, and economists now debate how to model diminished, as
opposed to full, rationality. See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics Addison-Wesley Educational
Publishers Inc., 2nd edition 1996 at pp. 10 et seq.  Much may depend  on how cost savings which
accrue as profits are distributed.
21  This is a version of justice  which regards the establishment of rights of employees as  part of a
commitment to industrial morality.  Its vindication exemplifies influence 2 on the development of
Labour Law.
22   For example, an employer may seriously damage an ex-employee's future employment prospects by
refusing to provide a reference for a prospective employer.  The ex-employee has no redress even if the
employer's refusal is on whimsical grounds: Spring v. Guardian Assurance plc [1994] IRLR 596.
6force for social cohesion. Others would object to an acceptance of the priority
of  aggregate wealth maximisation over individual justice.23
The view that influence 4 is paramount is also open to objection on other
grounds.   First,  it is not overtly part of the rhetoric and reasoning of the courts.
However, this is not in itself conclusive since the pursuit of a goal may be
intuitive rather than articulated. Alternatively, the judges' reasoning may be sub
silentio.  According to a positive theory, the question is whether such an
analysis can be identified as a  matter of historical fact, and this is not
exclusively determined by express judicial reasoning. 24
A further objection questions whether, if the judiciary is engaged in such an
agenda, it is venturing beyond its  competence. This is not  merely an issue
concerning the separation of powers; it also questions whether the judicial
process is equipped to engage in  a polycentric exercise in which many forces
beyond judicial control shape the national economy.  Further, considerable
controversy surrounds the ultimate validity of the theory of the economic
efficiency of law.  Advocates of this  theory, such as Judge R A Posner25 hold
that the implicit goal of the common law is to promote an efficient allocation of
resources.  This theory has been criticised on the ground inter alia that it lacks
sufficient empirical foundation26 and that it is not value neutral.27   Even
proponents of the theory such as Prof. Easterbrook admit that economic
                                                          
23  This is a central dilemma which concerns not only British labour lawyers, for example those  whose
work is cited above in  notes 2, 5 and 8, but also other scholars who are concerned that an economic
approach to law might signal that it is  instrumental rather than moral values which matter, see e.g.
Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Effiiciency? 98 Harv. L. Rev. 592 (1984).
24   Izhak Englard, The Philosophy of Tort Law, Dartmouth, Aldershot (1993) esp p36-37.
25    R A Posner,  The Economic Analysis of Law,  Boston, 4th edit.,  (1992), Tort Law: Cases and
Economic Analysis Little, Brown & Co. (1982). See also Easterbrook, infra n. 28.
26  Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, University of Chicago L.
Rev. 46 No. 2 307-315 (1979);  Bloustein, Privacy is Dear at any Price: A Reponse to Professor
Posner's Economic Theory, Georgia L. Rev 12, no 3 421-495 (1978); Rizzo, Uncertainty Subjectivity,
and  the Economic Analysis of Law, in Time, Uncertainty and Disequilibrium ( M J Rizzo, ed.)
Lexington: Lexington Books.  Other objections are that in the absence of accurate information abourt
the cost configuration the efficiency of the law cannot be judged: Goldberg, Relational Exchange:
Economics and Complex Contracts, Amercian Berhavioural Scientist, 23 no 3 337-352 (1980).
27   According to Tribe economic analysis of law  "assumes  unfettered contract, comsumer sovereignty,
social Darwinism and perfect markets.  It "exalts" possessive individualism, "efficient" resource
allocation and maximum productivity as against respect for distributive jusitce, procedural fairness and
the irreducible and inalienable values associasted with personal rights and public goods." Tribe,
Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency? 98 Harv. L. Rev. 592 , at p.  597
(1984).
98 Harv L. Rev
7influences on judicial reasoning cannot be  proved by deductive reasoning.28
Easterbrook's analysis, in common with that pursued in this article, offers only
illustrative examples of cases in which the formation of legal rules may have
been influenced by the judicial perceptions of the most efficient outcome.
However, the disquiet concerning whether or not the law can be judged
scientifically in terms  of economic efficiency is not central for present
purposes.29   The key question is whether the case law can be interpreted so as
to suggest that  particular legal rules may be shaped in the intuitive belief that
they will both influence the behaviour of employers and employees alike and
that this will maximise aggregate wealth.
The principal focus of this paper is the emerging line of authority amplifying
the  duty to act in good faith.  Good faith in this context is widely construed; it
is not restricted to decisions overtly founded upon  that doctrine.  This is so
because the idea of good faith is manifested in many guises: in particular, it
may appear within the more established duty to maintain trust and confidence,
or the duty to co-operate  or, indeed, within other decisions which may be
consistent with the orthodox conception of good faith  but within which good
faith is not expressly invoked as part of the reasoning.30  Nomenclature is not
conclusive in this context.  We are concerned with what has influenced the
development and application of these implied terms.   In order to achieve this it
is essential that there should be an understanding of the relationship between
these developing implied terms and  managerial prerogative.
THE PURPOSE OF MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE
Orthodox analysis of the duty to co-operate and, to a certain extent, the duty to
maintain trust and confidence emphasises a unitary model of employment
relations 31 As Fox and Davies and Freedland indicate,32 however, a unitary
                                                          
28  F Easterbrook, Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv L Rev 4 (1984).
29  An expression of this disquiet  can be found, for example, in Tribe's objections to the economic
analysis of law. He condemns, inter alia,  Easterbrook's ex ante anlysis in which the courts are less
interested in doing justice than in creating rules to adjust the behaviour of the world beyond the court
room.  Tribe  loc. cit.
30  E.g.,  Goold (Pearmark) Ltd v. McConnell [1995] IRLR 516.
31  E.g.,  Fox, Research Paper to Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer’s Associations,
Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations HMO 1966,  Napier, Judicial Attitudes to the Employment
Relationship (1977) 6 ILJ 1; and see the critical discussion of this issue in  Davies and Freedland,
Labour Law Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2nd edition, ( 1984) at pp. 310-311 and pp. 316-318.
8model which assumes a single source of authority and a single claim upon
loyalty within an enterprise is unconvincing.  The dynamics of the work place
are more complex and sophisticated.  For example, the matrix of  individual
loyalties may  encompass  loyalty to profession or trade,   loyalty to work-place
culture  and  loyalty to the team or department, as well as to the employer.
Moreover, groups within the work-place may exert competing claims to
benefits: demarcation disputes and comparability claims  have typically
exemplified such frictional pressures.
The problem of management is to harmonise and direct these competing
energies according to the strategy set by management.  A multiplicity of tools
have been employed to achieve this.  Human resource management methods
have been designed to unify and direct competing or self-interested forces.
Working methods (for example, team working) have been developed which
promote co-operation and the inter-relation of tasks, so that concern for the
whole is emphasised.  Other examples are found in initiatives, such as
Investors in People, which emphasise staff development to meet and promote
organisational goals.  "Empowerment" seeks to harness individual initiative
within  planned targets and so, by maximising the talent and seeking the
fulfilment of the individual worker, contributes to the efficiency of the
enterprise.  Profit-related pay is designed to reward commitment to the strategic
plan.
Where common purpose cannot be achieved by persuasive means, greater
coercive power has been conferred to ensure ultimate compliance.  This has
been assisted by the state which has weakened the interests of otherwise
powerful trade unions.  The means by which trade unions can deploy economic
power to counter-balance the subordination of the worker to the employer have
been emphatically blunted.33  The economic burden of organised conflict has
been further shifted onto the individual worker.34  Industrial action has become
increasingly risk bearing for the participants. 35  Thus, the state has
                                                                                                                                                                     
32  Id.
33 A seminal discussion of the principal developments can be found in Auerbach,  Legislating for
Conflict, Clarendon Press (1990) and  Davies & Freedland,  Labour Legislation and Public Policy,
Clarendon Press (1992).
34  See e.g., Wiluszynski v. Tower Hamlets LBC [1989] ICR 493.
35  Under ss 237 and 238 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 the
employer may dismiss all those taking part in industrial action.  Selective dismissal in the case of
unoffical action is also legitimated  unless the dismissed employee belonged to a trade union which had
authorised or repudiated the indutrial action by the time of the dismissal.  This is so provided, of course,
that none of the employees taking part are members of a trade union.
9acknowledged that the duty and the right of management is to direct the
competing and diverse energies within the enterprise towards the achievement
of management goals. The ability of others to organise effective dissent from
these goals has been severely weakened. The state's interest in this agenda lies
in its view that a successful national economy is achieved where the sum of
these individual managers’ efforts coalesces to generate a myriad of
competitive and successful business ventures.
Thus it can be argued that the enhancement of managerial prerogative since
1979  was designed to serve this end: overriding coercive power was bestowed
to secure management’s ability to strive towards maximum profit, 36  not only in
the interest of the individual enterprise, but also in the  belief that the national
economic interest would   thereby be advanced.  The corollary is that employers
bear a responsibility which is thought to resonate in a public as well as a private
arena; it is a responsibility to the national economy as well as to shareholders
and investors.  Thus  managerial power must be exercised rationally not only to
support the individual enterprise, but also the wider economic interest.
According to current economic orthodoxy if all individual enterprises are
optimally managed, provided other economic conditions are favourable,
aggregate wealth should be increased.
But this does not conclude the issue.  Coercive power may be fundamental but
cannot comprise the sole  motivational strategy.  Workers achieve more when
they are valued rather than simply coerced. In the modern working environment
it is insufficient if employees are expected merely to conform to a management
prescription of how their work should be performed.  More effective strategies
also ensure that employees enhance productivity by their own initiative.  A
successful management should  create a working environment which promotes
dignity, consultation, fairness, persuasion, prompt response to perceived
grievances, and redress of justifiable grievances. 37   This can be called the
"environment interest".  Absenteeism, bad time-keeping, high levels of staff
turnover, poor performance, indiscipline and low morale threaten to impede the
fundamental management objective of high productivity  and often occur where
the employer neglects  this interest.  The case law,  to which we shall refer,
demonstrates that implied terms have forced employers to address the
"environment interest", and it is argued that this is so because the resultant
                                                          
36   Profit is used in the context of this article to mean economic activity.
37  It is submitted that that which is justified must depend upon the reasonable opinion of the employer.
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efficient management of enterprise promotes the societal need for the
enhancement of aggregate wealth.
Fulfilment of this public need dictates a different course where the working
relationship has degenerated  into conflict.   Implied terms, in this context, have
been fashioned to contribute to the subordination of the employee and the rapid
defeat of organised resistance. Thus, it will be seen that the  growth of
employees' implied contractual rights has occurred exclusively in the context of
the "environment interest".   This is apparent in the emerging jurisprudence in
this broadly defined area of good faith and trust and confidence.
 THE EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE
(i) The Nature and Scope of a Duty of Good Faith
The primary focus of this article is to examine how and why the courts are
developing an implied duty of good faith.38   It has already been explained that
for present purposes good faith is widely construed to include developments in
the implied duties of co-operation and the duty to maintain trust and
confidence.  The new duty may, however, connote obligations wider than the
aggregate of these duties. 39  At a fundamental level it  recognises the obligation
to perform promises.  Fidelity to promises is an essential pillar of  justice, and
one the courts respect even if this entails the departure from the express formal
contents  of a bargain. Although at present the courts seem to be using this
principle to enforce the reality of agreement this controversial strand of
authority  might develop into a  principle that the spirit of the bargain is more
important than its strict letter.40
                                                          
38  The duty to act in good faith, as construed in this article, is a distinct obligation extending beyond
the employee’s acknowledged implied obligations to serve the employer faithfully and not to act
contrary to the employer’s  interest since it (inter alia) imposes significant obligations on the  employer.
See, e.g., per Lord Steyn in  Malik v. B.C.C.I. [1997] IRLR 462, 468.  For a discussion of the  orthodox
duty of loyalty see Smith & Wood, Industrial Law, 6th edition (1996) pp120 et seq.
39  Brodie advances a similar argument in The Heart of the Matter: Mutual Trust and Confidence
(1996) 25 ILJ 121 where he argues that the idea of trust and confidence is wider than the courts'
rhetoric suggests.  He notes that in  Goold (Pearmark) Ltd v. McConnell [1995] IRLR 516  and Scally
v. Southern Health and Services Board [1991] 4 All ER 563  the terms implied performed a similar
function to the duty to maintain trust and confidence since they demanded that employees be treated
with respect and dignity.  These ideas are central to  the trust and confidence duty.
40  See below under the heading The Reality of Agreement.
11
At a different level good faith appears to have a meaning of its own distinct
from the more recognised implied duties to co-operate, to maintain trust and
confidence and to serve faithfully.  The jurisprudence on this point remains,
however, to be coherently developed.   One difficulty is that  there are cases in
which  good faith  and the implied duty to maintain trust and confidence appear
to be treated as synonyms.   This was so in the recent case of  Adin v. Sedco
Forex International where Lord Coulsfield in the Court of Session, Outer
House  formulated one of the issues in the case as follows: "whether the general
obligation, often referred to as the obligation of trust and confidence or of good
faith, which has been held to be implied in contracts of employment, was
implied in this contract...." 41  (emphasis supplied).   However, there are
indications that  this approach might overlook the distinct and separate
existence of a doctrine of good faith.  In Imperial Group Pension  Ltd v.
Imperial Tobacco Ltd.,42  whilst the court appeared to treat good faith and the
duty to maintain trust and confidence as synonyms,   in relation to the former
employees, whose pensions were now in payment, it is difficult to understand
how the relationship of trust and confidence could be said to endure when the
relationship of employer and employee had ceased.  It would be contradictory
to assert that trust and confidence could survive once the employment
relationship had ended.  This means that the duties owed by the employer to the
former employees were rooted in a wider and distinct obligation of good faith.
A distinction  between trust and confidence and bad faith also informs the
reasoning in Post Office v. Roberts 43 where bad faith was held to be
unnecessary to a finding that trust and confidence had been breached. This
suggests that a breach of the duty to maintain trust and confidence is not
inevitably a breach of good faith. Conversely,  in  B.T. v. Ticehurst 44 a breach
of good faith may take place even if trust and confidence is unaffected by the
conduct impugned. This can be identified in the court's ruling on the facts that
the threat of all out strike action would not breach trust and confidence
although, of course, actual strike action would breach the duty to serve loyally.
(ii)  The Environment Interest
 The Environment Interest and Managements' Objectives
                                                          
41   [1997] IRLR 280, 283.
42  [1991] IRLR 66.
43  [1980] IRLR 347.
44  [1992] IRLR 219.
12
 It has been argued that successful employee relations result when management
nurtures an environment which promotes dignity, consultation, and fairness.
Unjust, dishonest or disrespectful treatment of employees or the ignoring of
their concerns prompts disharmonious and unproductive relations to which
employees are likely to respond in a number of ways damaging to the efficient
operation of the enterprise.  These may constitute   the withdrawal of the
worker (in the form of  absenteeism, bad time-keeping,  or higher levels of staff
turnover) or poor performance, indiscipline and low morale.  Each of these
tends to undermine the achievement of management goals, and so operate
contrary to the public interest in ensuring that enterprise is efficiently managed.
To address this the emerging doctrine of good faith has been developed so as to
juridify aspects of the environment interest.  Thus the promotion of the
environment interest is no-longer a matter to which effective managers can
merely aspire; it is infused with legally binding obligations which do not serve
an exclusively private function.
Prompt Action to Dispel the Causes of Conflict and Inefficiency
A breach of the implied duties associated with the environment interest arise
when management fails to recognise and address the early indications of
distress in the working environment. An early sign of this development was
evident in British Aircraft Corporation v. Austin 45 where the employer
committed a fundamental breach by failing promptly and sensibly to investigate
the employee’s complaint about safety.46     This development was placed upon
a more general footing in  the seminal decision in Goold (Pearmark) Ltd v.
McConnell47 where it was held that employers must afford a reasonable and
prompt opportunity to obtain redress of any grievance. An extreme example
occurred in  Smith v. Croft Inns Ltd.48  where, despite the finding that the
employers  would  not have been in breach in failing to take measures to protect
the employee from terrorist threats, they committed a fundamental breach  in
showing a complete lack of sympathy and concern for the plight of the
employee.   This finding is arguably  designed to remove  the causes of
                                                          
45  [1978] IRLR 332.
46  Note also that in Bracebridge Engineering Ltd. v. Darby  [1990] IRLR 3 the employee was entitled
to resign when the employer failed to treat her allegation of sexual harassment seriously.
47  [1995] IRLR 516.
48  [1996] IRLR 84.
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disillusionment and disappointment and so to enhance the possibility that the
employee will not be forced to resign.   Thus in each of these examples respect
for the implied duty would have promoted a  more efficient  outcome for the
employer than the resignations which actually occurred.
Reasons of efficiency also explain the ruling that a lack of support to a
supervisor under warning was repudiatory conduct since it rendered the
purported opportunity to improve nugatory, thus wasting the potential of the
employee to respond to the warning and forcing the employer to incur
unnecessary training and induction costs. 49 A different manifestation of the
same principle occurred where an employer failed to take appropriate action to
prevent the harassment of an employee and disruption of her work by fellow
employees. 50 After Burton v. De Vere Hotels, 51 where the employer was liable
52 because he could control whether the harassment occurred, it may now be
argued that the ability but failure to prevent abusive conduct by third parties
could constitute a fundamental breach of the contract of employment.   A
rational employer evaluating the risk of  this new potential liability should
adjust management policies to  prevent such abuse and so contribute to the
maintenance of a stable, efficient and productive workforce.
Ethics
Good faith has also been deployed to enforce management ethics: dishonesty in
itself is a fundamental breach of contract because dishonesty almost inevitably
produces a breakdown in working relations. 53  In Courtaulds Northern Textiles
v. Andrews,54 for example, the employer expressed a strong opinion on the
employee’s incompetence which the employer did not believe.  It was the
employer's dishonesty that constituted the breach of contract. 55   Since honesty
would not have incurred any cost, (unlike dishonesty which provokes
                                                          
49  Associated Tyre v. Waterhouse [1976] IRLR 386.
50  Wigan Borough Council v. Davies [1979] ICR 411.
51  [1997] ICR 1
52  Under ss. 1 and 4 of the Race Relations Act 1976.
53  Fyfe & McGrouther Ltd v. Byrne [1977] IRLR 29; Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v. Andrews
[1979] IRLR 84; Mihlenstedt v. Barclays Bank  [1989] IRLR 522.
54  Supra.
55  See also the remarks of Lord Denning MR in Woods v. W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd.
[1982] IRLR 413 at 415.
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resignation) the economically  efficient solution was clearly to develop a legal
rule requiring it.
In  Malik v. B.C.C.I.   the House of Lords similarly held that the operation by
the employer of a corrupt and dishonest business constitutes  a breach of the
duty to maintain trust and confidence.56  Significantly, the employer's conduct
does not have to be directed at the employee concerned who may even be
unaware that the conduct is taking place.  Lord Nicholls observed:
"the objective standard provides the answer to the (respondents) submission
that unless the employee's confidence is actually undermined there is no breach.
A breach occurs where the proscribed conduct takes place: here, by operating a
dishonest and corrupt business.  Proof of a subjective loss of confidence is not
an essential element of the breach."  57
This means that the employer's obligation to operate according to minimum
ethical standards is an important dimension of this implied duty . The fact that
this obligation is imposed even though the employee need not have suffered
any  actual loss of confidence in the employer demonstrates that trust and
confidence in this context is as much about the the public interest  in corporate
standards  as it is about protecting the employees' individual interests in their
economic livelihood. 58   Moreover, the fate of the Bank illustrated the
detrimental societal consequences of corruption.
Dignity
The environment interest encompasses cases where employers fail to respect
the dignity of their employees. In Wilson v. Racher 59 it was held that a duty of
mutual respect is imposed upon the parties to a contract of employment.
                                                          
56  [1997] IRLR 462.  If such a breach   prejudicially affects an employee's future employment
prospects so as to give rise to continuing financial loss, and it is reasonably foreseeable that such loss is
a serious possibility, in principle damages would be recoverable if injury to reputation (and so damage
to future employment prospects) could be established.
57  at p. 464.
58  The reasoning in Malik emphasises  that employees cannot be taken to have agreed to work in
furtherance of a corrupt and dishonest business.  The same might equally be said of employees
employed in a business operated recklessly or with gross incompetence, but their lordships did not
extend the employer's duty to embrace minimum standards of competence.
59  [1974] ICR 428.
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Accordingly, in Palmanor Ltd v. Cedron60 verbal abuse directed at an employee
was held to be capable of constituting a fundamental breach of contract.  The
employer is not excused if  the  remarks are addressed to a third party. 61 In
Hilton International Hotels (UK) Ltd v. Protopapa 62  a long serving employee
reprimanded in a location where others might overhear  in a manner which was
humiliating, intimidating, degrading and  unmerited in the circumstances was
entitled to terminate her contract of employment.
The Safety and Comfort of the Working Environment
Implied terms can also be linked to efficiency arguments in the context of
health and safety cases.63   The employer’s obligations have been extended
beyond the orthodox duty  to take reasonable care for the safety of their
employees. 64  Implied duties now  require employers to provide, as far as is
reasonably practicable, a working environment which is reasonably suitable for
the performance of the employees' duties.  This transcends issues of safety so as
to include such issues as reasonable comfort - a development which importantly
suggests a concern with working efficiency.  This is most evident where the
EAT in Waltons & Morse v. Dorrington 65 reached an express finding that the
term was breached even though there was no evidence of damage to the
complainant’s health caused by the smoking  of other workers. In this case it is
clear that the only rationale of the implied duty was to provide a comfortable
working environment to assist in ensuring the productivity of a majority of the
workforce.66
The Reality of Agreement
The honouring of contractual promises is fundamental to good management.
Certainty, fairness and the avoidance of conflict are promoted where promises
are duly honoured. Good faith demands no less than pacta sunt servanda since
                                                          
60  [1978]  ICR 1008.
61  Isle of Wight Tourist Board v. Coombes [1976] IRLR 413.
62  [1990] IRLR 317.
63  Walker v. Northumberland County Council [1995] IRLR 35.
64  Under  Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v. English [1938] AC 57  an employee is owed a threefold
duty by the employer: (i) to select proper staff; (ii) to provide adequate materials; and (iii) to provide a
safe system of working.  See further McCafferty v. Metropolitan Police etc. [1977] 2 All ER 756.
65  [1997] IRLR 488 the starting point for the implication of the term was the duties under the Health
and Safety at Work Act 1974, s2 (2) (e).
66   This is so because a smoking ban could arguably impede  the efficiency of workers addicted to
tobacco.
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the doctrine derives, in its most basic form, from a fundamental moral
obligation to perform promises.  One difficulty is  to determine which promises
to enforce.  This is most acute where an informal agreement conflicts with  later
inconsistent arrangements contained in a formal document, such as  the written
statement of particulars of employment or the contract itself.
In resolving this difficulty  the courts apply the contemplation standard under
which  effect is  given to obligations falling within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of contract.  It is the true agreement of the parties which is
enforced and not  some formal but incorrect expression of it. Accordingly, the
courts can disregard even the express words of contracts where  these conflict
with other inconsistent promises.    Aspden v. Webbs Poultry and Meat  Group
(Holdings) Ltd. 67 offers an example of this  in so far as an express power to
dismiss by reason of prolonged incapacity alone could not be enforced so as to
prevent an employee enjoying rights under a permanent health insurance
scheme introduced at an earlier date which depended on continued
employment. 68
Formal indications of consent to arrangements which do not reflect the real
agreement between the parties are thus not conclusive.  Even the signature of
the employee indicating apparent consent  to the later inconsistent arrangement
can be disregarded where there is clear evidence that a prior promise was still
intended to be binding.  This was so in Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering
Ltd. v. Rump 69 where the employee's signature on the subsequently issued
statement of particulars of employment was insufficient to denote his consent to
its terms because there was evidence that the  employee would not actually
have agreed to them   (notwithstanding the contrary indication represented by
his signature).  This development also is also explicable in efficiency terms.
The security and reliability of contracts is a pre-requisite of a  prosperous
economy; their absence absence has been thought to paralyse economies in the
Far East and  Eastern Europe.70
However, the problem raised by these decisions is the practical one that if the
courts are to give effect to the contractual contemplation of the parties (the
                                                          
67  [1996] IRLR 521.
68  See also Adin v. Sedco Forex International [1997] IRLR 280.
69  [1979] IRLR 425.
70  Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2nd edition
1996 at p. 7.
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reality of agreement) it must be possible to identify what this is. This is no easy
task where an alleged informal promise conflicts with the express words of the
contract.  First there is a certain danger of  revisionism in so far as one party
may seek to evade express obligations by alleging either prior or subsequent
promises of contrary effect.  These issues will have to be resolved as a matter of
evidence.  Secondly there may be problems where the courts give priority not to
what the parties actually agreed outside the formal document but what they
might have agreed had they considered the matter.  This is considered further
below. 71
(iii)  The Management of Conflict
Where conflict breaks out the common law agenda is clear: it insists on the
subordination of the employee to the interests of the employer.  There are few
correlative obligations on the employer.  The loyalty of the employee is owed
exclusively to the employer, notwithstanding that they may be resisting even
reasonable wage demands.  Accordingly, any outward defiance by the employee
to the employer's orders in order to show collective solidarity with other
workers  participating in industrial action is a fundamental breach of contract.72
The development of the duty of good faith in this context has been pivotal. One
well-known example of this occurs in Secretary of State v. ASLEF No.2 73 in
which it was decided that an employee who places  a literal and exacting
interpretation  on the employer's instructions  with the purpose of injuring the
employer's business  so as to secure a wage increase  breaches the implied duty
to act in good faith.74
Although it has been sought to explain this decision from a unitary perspective
75  its true significance can only be appreciated if this model is rejected.  This is
so even if, at one level of reasoning, the employees were contractually obliged
to co-operate in the commercial success of the venture by subordinating their
own economic claims to their employer's interest in a commercially successful
railway.  The deficiency in this analysis is, however, fundamental. The courts
did not progress to construct the doctrine of  good faith so as to establish a
                                                          
71  Under heading The Use of an Express Power for a Purpose Outside the Contemplation of the
Parties.
72 Bowes v. Press [1894] 1 QB 202.
73  [1972] 2  All E.R. 949.
74  Although   this is not so clear in the judgment of Roskill L.J. whose reasoning tends to emphasise
the effect of the industrial action. ([1972] 2  All E.R. 949 at p. 980).
75  Napier, Judicial Attitudes to the Employment Relationship (1977) 6 ILJ 1.
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correlative obligation on employers to have reasonable regard to the just
economic claims of employees in concluding annual pay negotiations. 76  This
suggests that the  decision satisfies only one of Fox’s criteria by which the
unitary model is judged: that the employees should subscribe to a single focus
of loyalty (the employer). 77    It ignores a further important criterion which is
that those engaged in the enterprise are  part of a team.  Fox's version of the
unitary model describes mutual loyalty and esteem which the ASLEF decision
necessarily lacks.
B.T. v. Ticehurst 78 arguably extends this one-sided version of the duty of co-
operation by emphasising that  employees commit a breach of contract
regardless of whether or not the industrial action they take is actually effective
to advance their claim. 79  The employer is entitled to lock them out without pay
even if disruption is minimal.  In these decisions the common law tightens the
restraints on the ability of workers to organise and to deploy economic
sanctions against employers.  In upholding the withdrawal of the wage the
courts permit the employer to strike at employees precisely where they are often
most vulnerable in order to encourage early capitulation.
Resort must be had to  utilitarian considerations to explain the apparent
harshness of these  decisions.  This is because, so framed,  the implied term can
be interpreted  as  addressing the possible impact of wage rises on counter-
inflationary policies. One crucial lesson of the voluntarist period demonstrates
that where employees wield effective economic sanctions to enforce wage
demands the national economy is set upon a path which leads to inflation and
the loss of competitveness in international markets. 80    The  systematic erosion
of the power of the trade unions to  target real economic power against
employers bears witness to the extent to which successive governments have
accepted this argument.  ASLEF and Ticehurst contribute to the employer's
                                                          
76  Murco v. Forge [1987] IRLR 50, although the implied duty  not to destroy trust and confidence
entails an obligation not to treat the individual employee arbitrarily capriciously  or inequitably in
remuneration matters:  Gardner v. Beresford [1978] IRLR 63; Pepper & Hope v. Daish [1980] IRLR
13.  See generally, Hough, Asking for More: The Legal Status of the Annual Pay Review.  (1991) 41
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 245
77  Alan Fox, Research Paper to Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer’s Associations,
Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations HMO 1966.
78   [1992] IRLR 219.
79  The breach of contract was the employee's failure to sign an undertaking to work normally, and so
motive by itself made what would otherwise be lawful a breach.  The decision removes any doubt
remaining after ASLEF that the employee is only in breach of contract where the industrial action is
actually effective in causing harm.
80  Davies & Freedland,  Labour Legislation  and Public Policy,  Clarendon Press (1992).
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armoury by encouraging the defeat (as rapidly as possible) of the disaffected
workforce using powerful economic means. 81   In conclusion, the common law
implied duties of fidelity and co-operation are utilised to demand the sacrifice
of the employee's short-term interests  for the sake  of the national economy.
The latter is a paramount consideration to which the interests of individual
employees have been made to yield.
(iv)  Modernisation and Competitiveness
It is not only in the field of industrial conflict that implied terms are deployed to
subordinate employees  to the management strategy.  A similar development
can be identified in the context of strategies to  modernise and improve
competitiveness.
The employer is precluded from seeking modernisation or enhanced
competitiveness by a unilateral variation of contract.82  Nevertheless, implied
terms within the existing contract ensure that the employee is expected to adapt
to new methods and techniques of working.83  The corollary is an obligation
binding the employer to provide reasonable training.84
Further, the employer may demand increased productivity  which the implied
duty to co-operate obliges the workforce to accept. 85 Similarly the employee is
not entitled to determine what is an appropriate standard of  work, even if the
work delivered is of a standard which was once acceptable. 86  In  an era of
rapid technological change this implied term ensures efficiency since, in its
absence, there would be a greater need to re-negotiate contracts.   It is in the
national economic interest that this should be so: improved standards help to
ensure the continued marketability if goods and services; staff turnover is
minimised, thereby reducing burdens on welfare and re-training; and the
competitiveness of the economy through the adoption of   technological
innovation  should enhance margins and generate investment and wealth.
                                                          
81  See also Wiluszynski v. LB of Tower Hamlets [1989] ICR 493.
82  Rigby v. Ferodo [1987] IRLR 516.
83  North Riding Garages v. Butterwick [1967] 2 QB 56.
84  Cresswell v. Board of Inland Revenue [1984] ICR 508.
85  Provided the increase is otherwise within the scope of the contract.
86  North Riding Garages v. Butterwick [1967] 2 QB 56.
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(v)  Controls on Managerial Discretion
 The common law has not shied from asserting limits on the substance of
management power. The purpose of these limits lies only partly in the private
domain. There is a value in protecting the employee from an unjustified,
arbitrary exercise of management power in the interests of justice and fairness.
Where there are no rational and overriding interests of the employer  to be
served by  disregarding the interests of the employee, efficiency arguments also
favour the limitation of managerial prerogative.   This is so in part because the
arbitrary exercise of management power will only randomly ensure economic
success.     It can be seen from the examples offered below that the courts test
the rationality of management decision-making since its converse tends to
detract from the efficient implementation of legitimate and reasonable
management objectives.
First,  as has been shown, the honest belief in the propriety of a decision is
itself fundamental to its lawfulness.87  But an  honest belief in the desirability of
a course of conduct is insufficient to justify it where that conduct is otherwise
irrational.  Three types of cases can be identified: (i) an irrational use of an
express contractual discretionary power; (ii) the use of a power for a purpose
outside the contemplation of the parties; (iii) otherwise acting capriciously or
without reasonable grounds.
(i)  The Abuse of an Express Contractual Power
Employers are required to show that they have reasonable grounds for
exercising an express contractual discretionary power.   This was so in  McLory
v. Post Office 88 where it was held that the employer's express power to
suspend, with or without pay, could only be exercised on reasonable grounds
and last only for so long as those grounds endured.  It is interesting that the
court so ruled even though the employees were actually suspended on full basic
pay.  Whilst the  implied terms serve the interests of the employees in not
depriving them of  the opportunity to earn overtime payments for a longer
period than was reasonably necessary, an alternative reading suggests that
employees should not be paid to kept idle in order to prevent an unwarranted
drain on the resources of the enterprise.
                                                          
87  See above the discussion of ethics.
88  [1992] ICR 758.
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In substance, limitations based on reasonableness were also implied on
efficiency grounds in  United Bank Ltd. v. Akhtar. 89   Here the junior and
poorly paid employee was ordered to transfer to a distant location at very short
notice with no re-location assistance from the employer (a matter which the
contract expressly reserved to the discretion of the employer). The EAT
implied terms precluding the employer from exercising the contractually
reserved discretion in such a manner as to make performance of the contract by
the employee impossible. 90
 (ii)   The Use of an Express Power for a Purpose Outside the Contemplation of
the Parties
The implied duty to act in good faith can also preclude the use of an express
contractual power for the pursuit of purposes collateral to the contract.91   The
courts examine the purpose of the discretion exercising party and inquire
whether that purpose is within the reasonable contemplation of the parties.
This may mean the rejection of a literal construction of express contractual
powers  where a literal reading would violate the reality of the inter-partes
agreement. This remains an expression of the idea of sanctity of contract, but it
is a version  which  emphasises substance over form. 92  If however the courts
reject express terms which the parties ostensibly would not  have agreed (as
opposed to terms to which they did not agree)  they would be venturing towards
the  application of a different model of contract.  The purpose of rejecting
express terms might  be for  redistributive reasons to ensure that the outcomes
of the contracting process are as nearly equal as is possible.  Alternatively, it
might be to remove barriers to efficiency.   This latter  interpretation is possible
in  United Bank Ltd. v. Akhtar93  where,  on the facts,  the bank could not
respect the duty to maintain trust and confidence and yet exercise its  express
discretion not to pay travelling expenses. Terms were implied  so as to  make
the contract workable.
                                                          
89  [1989] IRLR 507.
90  After White v. Reflecting Roadstuds Ltd. [1991] IRLR 331 and McLory v. Post Office [1992] ICR
758   the courts formally  adhere to the principle that there is no general implied requirement of
reasonableness in a  contract of employment.
91  Imperial Group Pension v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1991] IRLR 66.
92 Aspden v. Webbs Poultry and Meat  Group (Holdings) Ltd  [1996] IRLR 521.
93  [1989] IRLR 507.
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(iii)  Otherwise Acting  Irrationally
 There are also other  examples where irrational decisions constitute a breach of
contract even where they are not ostensibly founded upon an express
discretionary power.   For example, the lack of reasonable cause in requiring an
employee to undergo a psychiatric examination would par excellence exemplify
a breach of trust and confidence. 94
Many of the developments in the doctrine of good faith have occurred in the
context of unfair dismissal where  the common law has had a profound
influence on the scope of the statutory  framework. 95  There is a synergy
between statutory interpretation and the development of the common law in  the
influence of good faith as an instrument for enhancing efficiency.  For example,
before using the statutory power to dismiss for misconduct, an employer is not
obliged to prove that misconduct beyond all reasonable doubt, but tribunals
insist upon an honest belief in guilt which can  be sustained on reasonable
grounds. 96 Similarly, the honest belief that a re-organisation involving a
unilateral variation of contract is in the interest of the enterprise will not of
itself justify the dismissal of an employee who resists that change.97
CONCLUSION
The common law has been instrumental in extending  protection to employees
at a time when contemporary government is generally quiescent towards the
interests of  business.   Terms implied by law into all contracts of employment
have afforded the judiciary with the means of juridifying new employment
standards.  Controversially, this work is not, however, solely dedicated to the
exclusively private purpose of redistributing economic power within the
employment relationship.  It is also  intended to  address  the public interest  in
                                                          
94  Bliss v. South  East Thames Regional Health Authority [1985] IRLR 308.
95  E.g.,  Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd. v. Sharp [1978] ICR 221 concerning the scope of consructive
dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996,  s. 95 (1) (c). Other examples, include cases in which
the frustration of the contract negates a dismissal: Notcutt v. Universal Equipment Ltd. [1986] IRLR
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96  British Home Stores Ltd. v. Burchell [1978] IRLR 379.  
97  Evans v. Elementa Holdings Ltd. [1982] ICR 233.
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a successful economy.     The   traditional laissez-faire model of contract is
unsuited to these developments, and many judges are no longer influenced by
it.98  Rhetoric aside, the judiciary do recognise that the state has an interest in
the content of the contract of employment.
However, the judiciary is not bound (or fettered) by the view that the state
should extend minimum standards of employment rights to employees.    If it
were   the courts might have been expected to address obvious gaps in
protection left by the inequality of bargaining power.  For example, the
common law has not developed an implied right to a holiday or to rest periods
during working hours.99     Implied rights to health and safety may yield to
conflicting express terms. 100  In  McLory v. Post Office 101  it was re-
emphasised  that the rules of natural justice would not be imported into a purely
contractual relationship.102 No automatic right to sick pay is as yet implied into
a contract of employment.103    And   the courts have not established a general
right for the employee  to be provided with work.104   Nor is there any general
duty to give a reference to a prospective employer.105    Most recently in Malik
v. B.C.C.I. 106 it was held that there is no common law duty to take steps to
improve an employee's job prospects notwithstanding that this would be a
matter of central importance to employees.    The court have also refused to
                                                          
98  Ali v. Christain Salveson Food Services Ltd. [1997] IRLR 17 is perhaps an exception.  However, the
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106   [1997] IRLR 462.
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imply a right to an annual pay increase even to preserve the real value of the
wage after inflation. 107
It also seems evident that the development of good faith has not been solely
influenced by a desire to re-fashion the  employment relationship as a co-
operative and mutually supportive endeavour. Decisions which subordinate the
employee in cases of organised conflict discredit any  unitary explanation of
the development of the new implied obligations. "  Although influences 2 and 3
can be recognised in the common law, the courts extend minimum rights to
employees in the interests of justice where to do so is conceived to be
compatible with the enhanced efficiency of the enterprise. Thus influence 4 is
paramount.   Employees are unlikely to benefit where the courts perceive that
an asserted implied right will be unduly financially onerous 108  or otherwise
unduly burden the efficient working of the employer's undertaking. 109    Yet the
promotion of the "environment interest" demonstrates that some implied rights
not only recognise the moral claims of employees to fair treatment but also tend
to promote optimal efficiency.  This interest provides one context in which
future developments are likely.
Recent statutory extensions of employees' rights have been made by the
regulations on working time.110  There is also the imminent introduction of the
national minimum wage and the  statutory  implementation of the Parental
Leave Directive 96/34 and Part-time Workers Directive 97/81.111 It should not
be forgotten that most of the development of implied terms followed the re-
contractualisation of the employment law in the context of unfair dismissal
after Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd. v. Sharp. 112   These directives may
provide causes of action  the resolution of which might depend upon further
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development of implied terms. 113    It remains to be seen whether future
developments will follow the themes we have endeavoured to identify.  If the
resilience and creativity of the common law  in interpreting and supplementing
unfair dismissal is a guide, there will be some scope to  the judiciary's struggle
to reconcile rights with efficiency.
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